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I.

Introduction

Economic theory predicts that in long-run competitive equilibrium the price of a good or service
will equal the minimum average costs associated
with the most efficient production technologyfirms that have inefficient technologies and
higher average costs will not survive. The coexistence over long periods of time of alternative
technologies performing the same function thus
poses an interesting economic puzzle. Prominent
examples are alternative distribution systems for
the same or sImilar financial service, such as fullservice and discount brokers for performing
securities trading; automatic teller machines and
human tellers for distributing cash; banks, savings and loans, and credit unions for delivering
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Property-liabIlIty insurance IS distnbuted
through a direct-writer
system, where agents
represent one lllsurer,
and an independentagency system, where
agents represent several insurers. Independent-agency insurers
have hIgher costs than
direct writers. The
market-impe rfections
hypothesis attributes
the coexistence of the
two types of insurers
to impediments to competition, whtle the
product-quality hypothesis holds that independent-agency insurers
provide hlgher-quahty
servIces. We measure
cost efficiency and
profit effiCiency for
property-liabIlIty insurers and find strong
support for the product-qualIty hypotheSIS,
ImplYlllg that independent-agency lllsurers
produce higher-quality
outputs and are compensated by higher revenues.
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depository servIces; and banks and capital markets for providing loans
to busmesses (Fama 1985).
This article focuses on a partIcularly interesting case of financialservices distribution, property-liability insurance. Property-liability insurance is distributed by two different types of firms: direct-writing
insurers that distribute insurance through exclusive agents who represent only one insurer, and independent-agency insurers that distribute
their product through independent agents who represent multiple insurers. These systems have long interested researchers because they have
coexisted in insurance markets for many decades, even though independent-agency insurers are known to have higher costs (e.g., Joskow
1973; Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Pauly, Kunreuther, and Kleindorfer 1986; Kim, Mayers, and SmIth 1996). The purpose of this article
is to analyze the reasons for the long-term coexistence of the directwriting and independent-agency dIstribution systems.
Two primary hypotheses have been advanced to explain the coexistence of the two systems. According to the market-impeifections hypothesis, independent-agency insurers survIve while providing essentially the same services as direct-wnting insurers because of market
imperfections, such as pnce regulation (Joskow 1973; Cummins and
VanDerhei 1979; Weiss 1990), slow diffusion of information in insurance markets (Berger, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther 1989), or search costs
that permit inefficient firms to survive alongside efficient firms (Dahlby
and West 1986). Under the market-impeifections hypothesis, effiCIent
firms are expected to earn supernormal risk-adjusted profits, while mefficient firms will earn risk-adjusted profits closer to normal levels.
In contrast, according to the product-quality hypothesis, the higher
costs of independent-agency insurers represent expenses associated
with producing higher product quality or greater service intensity, such
as providmg additional customer assistance with claims settlement, offering a greater variety of product choices, or reducing policyholder
search costs (Pauly et aI. 1986; Kim et al. 1996; Regan and Tennyson
1996). This hypothesis predicts normal risk-adjusted profits for both
direct-writing and independent-agency firms.
The product-quality hypothesis Imphes that firms are sorted into
product-quality or service-intensity market niches, WIth customers who
prefer higher quality paying more for the product. The higher prices
receIved by the higher-quality providers cover their extra production
costs, allowing these firms to survive in equilibrium. This rationale
is broad enough to encompass agency-theoretic explanations for the
eXIstence of alternative technologies (e.g., Mayers and Smith 1981;
Kim et al. 1996). For example, principal-agent problems, such as
company/buyer incentive conflicts, may be more important to some
buyers or for some product vanants, leading to the survival of dIstributIOn systems that deal efficiently with thIS type of incentive conflict.
Thus, independent-agency insurers may survive because they more ef-
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fectively discipline insurers into paying legitimate claims promptly and
fairly. Independent agents can credibly threaten to shift business to an
alternate insurer because their contracts with insurers convey ownership of the policyholder list to the agent (i.e., the company cannot approach policyholders directly), whereas exclusive agents usually do not
have this ownership right.
Because product quality in insurance is essentially unobserved, researchers have been unable to reach a consensus on whether the marketimperfections hypothesis or the product-quality hypothesis is more
consistent with the observed cost data. This lack of consensus leaves
open the interesting economic question of whether the market works
well in minimizing product-distribution costs and leaves unresolved
the issue of whether marketing costs in property-liability insurance are
excessive and perhaps should receive regulatory attention. I
This article proposes a new methodology for distinguishing between
the two hypotheses. Usmg frontier efficiency methods, we estimate
both cost and profit efficiency for direct-writing and independentagency insurers. Measuring cost efficiency enables us to determine
whether the cost efficiency difference between direct-writing and independent-agency insurers found by prior researchers persists under our
methodology. Measuring profit efficiency helps to identify unobserved
product-quality differences because customers should be willing to pay
extra for higher quality. Thus, our approach allows for the possibllity
that one group may provide higher-quality service on average and be
rewarded with higher average revenues that are reflected in profit efficiency. That is, the profit-efficiency approach allows for the possibllity
that some firms may incur additional costs providing superior service
and be compensated for these costs through higher revenues.
A key statistic in our analysis will be the proportion of the difference
in measured cost efficlency between the firms employing the two distribution systems that remains when we estimate profit efficiency. If most
of the measured cost-efficiency difference remains as a profit-efficiency
difference, then the market-imperfections hypothesis would be supported. In this event, the profit efficiency, which includes both cost
efficiency and revenue efficiency, would reinforce the efficiency difference between the two groups. In contrast, if most of the measured costefficiency difference is eliminated when the more encompassing profit
efficiency is measured, then the product-quality hypothesis would be
supported. This event would be consistent with the difference in service
quality being reflected in higher revenues.
By way of preview, we find data on 472 insurers over the period
I Regulators In several states, including CalifornIa, Flonda, and Massachusetts, have
argued that the hIgh costs of automobIle Insurance are partly attnbutable to Insurer inefficIency In marketing, admlntstratlOn, and claims settlement and that such ineffiCIenCIes
should be dISCIplined through pnce regulatton
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1981-90 to be fairly consistent with the product-quality hypothesis.
We measure independent-agency insurers as less cost efficient on average than direct writers, but most ofthis measured cost-efficiency difference does not translate into a profit-efficiency difference. Indeed, after
conditioning on firm characteristics, such as size and business mix, the
profit-efficiency difference between the two groups of firms is quite
small and not statistically significant, even though a large, significant
cost-efficiency difference is still present.
The article is organized as follows. Section II summarizes some of
the problems encountered in the extant empirical literature and discusses in an intuitive manner how our methodology addresses these
difficulties. Section III gives the details of our methodology and model
specification. Section IV discusses the measurement of inputs, outputs,
and prices in property-liabihty insurance, and Section V describes the
data set. Section VI presents "simple" tests based on the average efficiency differences between direct-writing and independent-agency insurers, and Section VII provides" sophisticated" tests, which condition
on other firm characteristics that may affect efficiency. Section VIII
concludes.
II. Methodological Difficulties in the Extant Literature

Three major methodological problems have been encountered in the
literature on insurance distribution systems. First, product quality is
essentially unobserved. If some firms incur additional costs in providing a hIgher-quality product to consumers, such as extra assistance with
claims settlement or greater product variety, this may be incorrectly
identified as cost inefficiency unless proper controls for product quality
are used. Ex ante, we might expect better service from independent
agents because they can offer customers choices among the products
of many insurance companies, perhaps better tailoring the insurance
product to the needs of the individual customer. In addition, independent agents may be more likely to act as advocates for customers in
claims-settlement disagreements than exclusive agents since independent agents are not tied to the individual insurer and can threaten to
steer business elsewhere if settlements are unsatIsfactory (see Kim et
al. 1996). Unfortunately, control variables for insurance product quality
are generally lacking in the data sets available to researchers. 2
In this article, we estimate profit efficiency, which incorporates both
cost and revenue efficiency and should net out most of the unobserved
differences in product quality. In an efficiently functioning output mar2 Although pnor research has consistently shown mdependent-agency msurers to have
higher costs than direct wnters, It IS not obvIOUS a pnon that thiS should be the case For
example, mdependent-agency msurers might benefit by shanng their agents' fixed costs
With other msurers, Yleldmg lower costs than direct wnters However, any such gams may
be diSSipated m praclice because of the difficulty of dealmg With multiple sets of fOflllS,
procedures, and computer systems by mdependent agents.
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ket, customers who prefer higher-quality insurance services will pay
more for these services, compensating the firm with additional revenues
that cover the extra costs of providing the higher-quality services.
The second major difficulty encountered in empirical studies of the
product-quality versus inefficiency issue lies in the specification of the
null and alternative hypotheses. Most previous studies took as the null
hypothesis that all property-liability insurers have the same managerial
competence or efficiency. As the alternative hypothesis, these studies
allowed the predicted costs to differ only by a constant for the firms
in the direct-writer and independent-agency groups (e.g., Joskow 1973;
Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Pauly et al. 1986). That IS, the maintained hypothesis for these tests was that there were no efficiency differences within either group, with the alternative hypothesis only
allowing for a crude shift in efficiency between the two groups.
Advances in the measurement of efficiency have rendered such comparisons obsolete. Frontier studies of efficiency in the insurance industry by Weiss (1990); Bughin (1993); Cummins and Weiss (1993);
Fecher et al. (1993); Gardner and Grace (1993); Yuengert (1993); and
Cummins and Zi (in press) found very significant dispersion in efficiency both within groups of insurers and between groups of insurers,
clearly rejecting the maintained hypothesis of only one or two efficiency levels for all insurers.
In contrast to the prior studies comparing distribution systems in
property-liability insurance, we use frontier efficiency models to allow
for efficiency differences within each group of insurers. That is, each
firm is allowed to have its own level of efficiency. We conduct two
sets of tests. Under our simple tests, the null and alternative hypotheses
are that the average efficiencies of the direct-writer and independentagency groups are equal and unequal, respectively. Under our sophisticated tests, the null and alternative hypotheses are that the efficiencies
of direct-writing and independent-agency firms are equal and unequal,
conditional on other factors not fully under the control of insurers in
the short run. To conduct the sophisticated tests, we regress the measured cost and profit inefficiencies on variables representing firm organizational form (stock vs. mutual form of ownership), product mix, and
size as well as dummy variables for the direct-writer distribution system versus the independent-agency distribution system. The sophisticated version enables us to test whether direct writers have different
expected costs or profits than mdependent-agency firms for delivering
the same output mix and quantity within the same organizational form.
The third major difficulty in the prior literature is that the cost functions specified were often ad hoc. Generally, output was measured by
a single proxy variable-total losses or premiums-despite the
multiproduct nature of the property-liability insurance business (e.g.,
Joskow 1973; Braeutigam and Pauly 1986; Pauly et al. 1986). Subsequent literature on frontIer efficiency in financial services has allowed
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for mUltiple products and typically used the standard translog cost function specification (e.g., Weiss 1990; Cummins and Weiss 1993). The
issue of the coexistence of the two distribution systems for propertyliability insurance has not been investigated using these multiproduct,
frontier efficiency techniques.
The latest efficiency studies of financial institutions have taken two
further steps, which we combine in our empirical analysis. First, in
addition to analyzing cost efficiency, we also analyze profit efficiency,
which incorporates both cost and revenue efficiency and can help ameliorate problems of unobserved product-quality differences (see Berger,
Hancock, and Humphrey 1993; Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey
1997; Akhavein, Swamy, Taubman and Singamsetti 1997). Second, we
adopt the Fourier-flexible functional form for our cost and profit function, a global approximation that has been shown to dominate the commonly specified translog form in fitting financial institution data (see
McAllister and McManus 1993; Mitchell and Onvural 1996; Berger,
Leusner, and Mingo 1997). Global approximations are particularly important when studying an industry like insurance, where firm scale and
product mix vary widely. Local approximations, such as the translog,
often perform poorly at points well away from the mean and thus are
potentIally quite inaccurate for describing much of the data.
As an addItional check on the results, we also estimate efficiency
from an alternative profit function that replaces the output prices in
the standard profit function with output quantities, effectIvely treating
output scale and mix as fixed (see Humphrey and Pulley 1997). Testing
the sophIsticated version of the hypotheses and estimating two different
profit-function specifications helps to ensure that our conclusions are
not affected by differences in firm characteristics or equation specification.
III. Methodology and Econometric Model Specification

Cost efficiency is defined as the minimum costs that could have been
expended to produce a given output bundle divided by the actual costs
expended (cmm!i:;act), both adjusted to be predicted values in order to
remove random error that temporanly makes costs high or low. The
cost-efficiency ratio may be thought of as an estimate of the proportion
of total costs or resources that are used efficiently. The ratio varies
over the range (0, 1], with higher numbers indicating greater efficiency.
Similarly, profit efficiency IS the ratio of predicted actual profits to the
predicted maximum potential profits that could be earned (ic"c'/icm"X).
Thus, the profit-efficiency ratio estimates the proportion of potentIal
profits that are realized. Profit effiCIency is also maximized at one,
where predicted actual profits equal potential profits. The range of profit
effiCIency is (-00, I)-there is no minimum since profits can be negative of any magnitude.
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As explained below, we report estimates of inefficiency rather than
efficiency in order to facilitate comparisons between the cost and profit
function results. The dollar value of cost inefficiency equals actual
costs minus minimum costs and thus represents the part of actual costs
that is wasted because of inefficiency. Similarly, the dollar value of
profit inefficiency equals potential profits minus actual profits and thus
represents the part of potential profits that is lost because of inefficiency. We will divide both measures of inefficiency by the same denominators to make them comparable below.
Our efficiency analysis utilizes the' 'distribution-free" methodology
introduced by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and modified by Berger
(1993). This approach avoids imposing arbitrary distributional assumptions on the data in order to separate inefficiencies from random error.
Instead, we simply assume that inefficiencies are persistent or stable
over time, whereas random error tends to average out over time. Other
efficiency methods typically require quite restrictive distributional assumptions concerning the random errors and inefficiencies that affect
costs, profits, or production. 3
Formally, we refer to inputs and outputs as "netputs" and distinguish between variable and fixed netputs in our cost and profit models.
The vector Y == (Yb Yo, YF) denotes the netput vector containing n variable inputs Yb m variable outputs Yo, and q fixed netputs YF, with the
variable inputs YI measured negatively so that for both inputs and outputs the Y values give the net supply by the firm. The fixed netputs are
inputs or outputs that are taken as given by the firm because they are
difficult to change in the short run. The vector P == (p b Po, P F) denotes
the corresponding price vector.
The cost functIOn for insurer i, which takes as exogenous the input
prices Pb variable outputs Yo, and fixed netputs Y F, is specified as
(1)

where VC is variable costs PI . YI (multIplication dot indicates inner
product); C(Pb Yo, YF) is a cost function with input prices, variable
outputs, and all fixed netputs as arguments; In U c is an efficiency factor;
and In e c is a random error term. ThIS composed error, In U c + In e"
will be separated out below using the assumption that the efficiency
factor In u( is stable over time, while the random error In e c tends to
average out over time.
The profit function is specified very simIlarly to the cost function:

(2)

3 The assumption that effiCienCIes are relatively stable over tIme has been supported
by earher research (see Berger and Humphrey 1991, 1992, Berger 1993) See Berger,
Hunter, and Timme (1993) for a diSCUSSIOn of alternative effiCIency-measurement techmques
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where n denotes profits plus a constant described below, In u" is an
efficiency factor, and In e" is a random error term. The major difference
between the two functions is that variable output prices Po in the profit
function replace variable output quantities Yo in the cost function. Under profit maximization, the firm is free to choose the variable outputs
to maximize profits and failure to do so results in measured profit inefficiency. Thus, profit inefficiency includes cost inefficiency from nonoptimizing levels of inputs plus revenue inefficiency from nonoptimizing levels of outputs. 4
The Fourier-flexible functional form used for the cost and profit
functions includes both pure Fourier trigonometric terms (cosines and
sines) and a standard translog. In forming the trigonometric terms, we
adjust each of the price and output terms to lie within the interval [0,
2n] before taking cosines and sines. For notational convenience, we
define ZC to be the transformed values of the cost-function arguments
(Ph Yo, YF) and z" to be the transformed values of the profit-function
arguments (Ph Po, YF).5
The Fourier-flexible form for the cost function may be written as
n

In C(Ph Yo, YF) = a

+

I

<p,lnp,

1=1
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4 Because profits may be nonpOSltlve and logs can only be taken of pOSItive numbers,
we mclude in 7t the value one plus the absolute value of the largest negative profits m the
sample That IS, the dependent van able for firm k at tIme t IS In 7t" "" In (PROFIT., + I
+ iPROFITmmJ), where PROFIT" IS measured profits and mm mdlcates the sample mmlmum, which IS negatIve ThIS modIfication IS made for all observations.
5. We cut 10% off of each end of the [0, 27tj mterval to reduce approxImation problems
near the endpomts Thus, for each argument of the cost or profit functIOn In x, we form
the adjusted vanable z "" .21t - Jl a + Jl In x, where [a, bjls the range of In x and Jl ""
(9 21t - .1 21t)/(b - a)
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Thus, each of the input prices, variable output quantities, and fixed
netput quantities appears in the translog and Fourier functions, up to
the second order in the translog and third order in the Fourier (time
and finn subscripts are suppressed for notational convenience). The
standard symmetry restrictions apply to the translog portion of the function (<\l'J = <\lJP ~n = ~sr)' The profit function has exactly the same
functional form and the same number of tenns as the cost function;
that is, it includes the standard translog tenns and the same number
and type of trigonometric terms. The only difference IS that output
prices (Po) appear in the standard profit function in place of the output
quantities (Yo) that appear in the cost function (wIth the appropriate
change in the z terms as well). The alternative profit function is exactly
the same as the cost function, the only difference being the dependent
variable. Actual profits are used as the dependent variable in both the
standard and alternative profit functions.
We use the same functional fonn for the cost and profit functions
so that any differences we observe in measured cost and profit efficiencies are due to the efficiency concept (i.e., cost efficiency vs. profit
efficiency) and not to the choice of functional form. Using the same
functional fonn enables us to avoid confounding inefficiency differences with specification differences. The alternative profit function and
the cost function not only have the same functional fonn but also have
exactly the same right-hand side varIables as well.
The models are estimated using a pooled cross-section, time-series
sample of 472 Insurers wIth continuously available data over the 10year period 1981-90. Inefficiency is estimated for each finn by averaging its residuals over the lO-year period, truncating the distribution of
average residuals across finns, and then computing efficiency relative
to the finns with the best average residuals (lowest for costs, highest
for profits). Specifically, under the dIstribution-free method, the costfunction error term for insurer k at time t On Uckt + In eckt) is treated
as a composite error term, and the average of the 10 residuals for each
insurer k IS calculated. This average residual, denoted by In UCb is an
estimate of In Ucb given that the random errors In eckt tend to cancel
each other out in the averaging. 6 The estimated cost efficiency for finn
k, EFFcko is then calculated as

(4)
6 Because the averaglllg procedure IS Imperfect, the average residuals still contam some
error from the In e,k, not fully canceling out over the IO-year penod as well as standard
estimatIOn error ThiS error IS likely to be largest for msurers near the extremes of the In
Utk'S, winch may have had persistently "lucky" or "unlucky" random errors that did not
fully average out For thiS reason, we compute truncated measures as m Berger (1993),
settmg the top and bottom 5% of the In U'k'S to the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively.
of their dlstnbutlOns
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where In a:;'In is the minimum In ack and acts as an "anchor" so that
the firm with the lowest average cost function residual is measured as
being 100% efficient.
Profit efficiency is computed similarly to cost efficiency.7 Our measured profit efficiency ratio, EFF"b is an estimate of the ratio of predicted profits for insurer k to the predicted profits for the most efficient
insurer, both evaluated at the mean levels for the profit function regressors for firm k. 8
IV. Definition and Measurement of Outputs and Inputs

This section briefly discusses several measurement issues in constructing the data set. We first describe the process for choosmg which
services to measure as outputs in property-liability msurance. We then
show how we measure the output and input quantities and prices used
in the cost and profit functions. More detailed information IS available
from the authors.

Definition of Insurance Output
Insurers are analogous to other financial firms in that their outputs consist primarily of services, many of which are intangible. Three principal
approaches have been used to define outputs in the financial services
sector: the asset or intermediation approach, the user-cost approach,
and the value-added approach (see Berger and Humphrey 1992). We
adopt a modified version of the value-added approach here, which
7. We use total profits 10 construct1Og the dependent vanable for the profit functIOn
rather than vanable profits, which would be analogous to vanable costs If output pnces
and quanlilies were measured perfectly, the dependent vanable 1C would be appropnately
measured us10g vanable profits However, It IS Important for studY10g the queslion at hand
to allow for the pOSSibility that output pnces and quanhtles may not be measured well,
Ie, that there may be Important product-quality differences that are not 1Ocorporated 10
these measures. Thus, we allow for the pOSSibility that firms us10g one of the dlstnbutlOn
systems may be more effiCient on average If they proVide higher (unmeasured) product
quality on average and receive higher revenues refiect10g thiS
8 A comphcat1Og factor IS that actual profits are not mulliplicahve m the effiCiency
factor u. because of the addlhon of an extra constant (one plus the absolute value of the
largest negahve profits) before loggmg the profits The effiCiency rallO for firm k will
therefore depend somewhat on the level of the regressors 10 the profit funchon, so we
evaluate effiCiency at the mean values of the regressors for the firm. Formally, for 10surer
k, we compute the average predicted value of the dependent vanable In 1Cfred as the 10ner
product of the regressIOn coeffiCients and the mean regressors for firm k plus the average
reSidual In U.k (truncated at the 5th and 95th percentiles as above). The value that the
dependent vanable would take for a fully effiCient firm fac10g firm k's mean regressors
IS In 1Cj~ = In 1C~red + In u;"" - In U.b where In u;" IS the maximum value of the In U.k
dlstribuhon (after truncatIOn). Undo1Og the logs and subtract10g the constant (1 + IPROFITnunl) from both predicted and maximum profits gives PROFITl"d = exp(ln 1Cl"d) - (I
+ IPROFITmml) and similarly for PROFITjax The profit-effiCiency ratIO IS thus given by
PROFITl"d/PROFITjax
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counts as important outputs those that have significant value added, as
Judged using operating cost allocations.
Property-liability insurers provide three principal services:
1. Risk pooling and risk bearing. Insurance provides a mechanism
for consumers and businesses exposed to property-liability losses to
engage in risk reduction through pooling. The actuarial, underwriting,
and related expenses incurred in pooling are major components of value
added in the industry. Insurers also add value by holding equity capital
to bear the residual risk of the pool.
2. Real services relating to insured losses. Insurers provide a variety of real services for policyholders, including risk surveys, coverage
design, loss-prevention serVIces, and loss-settlement services. By contracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders can take
advantage of insurers' extensive experience and specialized expertise
to reduce costs associated with insurable risks.
3. Intermediation. Insurers collect premiums in advance of loss
payments and hold the funds in reserves until claims are paid, similar
to corporate debt. Policyholders receive a discount in their premiums
to compensate for the opportunity cost of the funds held by the insurer,
analogous to interest payments on corporate debt. The borrowed funds
are invested primarily in marketable securities.
Obtaining precise information on value added in property-liability
insurance is difficult, but some rough estimates are available to help
identify outputs. In 1994, about 32.0% of total industry operating expenses (expenses other than paid and incurred losses) were for losssettlement services, the primary real service provided by the industry.
About 65.8% of operating costs were accounted for by marketing and
administratIve costs. Some of these costs are attributable to real services but the majority, such as actuarial, underwritlllg, and administrative costs, are attributable to the risk pooling/bearing function. The
remaining 2.2% of operating expenses were absorbed by the intermediation function. The small percentage of operating costs attributable to
intermediation reflects the fact that property-liability insurers invest almost exclusively in marketable seCUrIties.
A strict application of the value-added approach would identify risk
pooling/bearing and real services as important outputs and intermediation as an unimportant output. However, in view of the amount of assets
controlled by insurers (about $705 billion in 1994) and the importance
of investment income as a source of revenue for the industry, we elected
to retain the intermediation function in defining industry output. This
is particularly important in estimating the profit function in view of
the fact that insurers rely on investment lllcome to cover the premium
discount for the use of policyholder funds. A small amount of inefficiency in lllvesting these funds could easily wipe out all profits.
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Measurement of Output Quantities
Unfortunately, transactions flow data to measure insurance outputs,
such as the number of applications processed, the number of policies
issued and renewed, the number of claims settled, and so forth, are not
available. However, a satisfactory proxy for the amount of risk pooling/
bearing and real insurance services provided is the present value of
real losses incurred. Losses incurred are defined as the value of claims
that are expected to be paid as the result of providing insurance coverage during a particular period of time. 9 Because the objective of risk
pooling/bearing is to collect funds from the policyholder pool and equity providers and redistribute these funds to those who incur losses,
proxying output by the amount of losses incurred seems quite appropriate.
There are two drawbacks to the use of discounted real losses as the
metric for insurance output, both of which are addressed by our use
of the profit function. First, although services are likely to be highly
correlated with real losses for both direct writers and independentagency firms, measured losses will not capture any systematIc differences between direct writers and independent-agency insurers in the
levels of service intensity per dollar of loss. Such differences in intensity levels, such as additional help to customers in loss settlement or
policy choice, likely cannot be well measured by losses or by any other
observable variables. Use of the profit function may help ameliorate
this problem, since the unmeasured extra service will create revenues
that tend to offset the costs of providing the service.
The second drawback of using losses incurred to measure insurance
output is that its use ignores the output qualitIes of loss control and
risk management. An insurer that is very successful in its underwriting
and loss-prevention practices will incur fewer losses for the same
amount of premiums written but will be measured as having less output.
Similarly, a firm that is relatively successful at managing its risks will

9 The measure of losses we use IS calendar year (CY) losses mcurred The CY losses
mcurred mclude the compames' current estimates (as of the end of year t) of losses mcurred
due to coverage proVided m year t, Ie, aCCident year (AY) losses mcurred, as well as the
loss reserve adjustment (LRA), which represents the addition to (or subtractIOn from) A Y
losses m year t due to revISIons m reserves for pnor years' losses We Illclude the LRA
m our loss measure because excludmg It would result III our uSlllg a prelzmmary measure
of output rather than actual output We Illclude the LRA III the year III which the adjustment
IS made rather than the year of ongm of the poliCies glVlllg nse to the adjustment because
the LRA reflects new mformatlOn on the frequency and/or seventy of claims that becomes
aVailable m year t and also reflects services such as legal-defense and loss-adjustment
services proVided m year t rather than the year of ongm As a practical matter, the year
to which the LRA IS aSSigned IS likely to have mlmmal effects m any case, given our use of
the dlstnbutlOn-free approach to measunng effiCiency Under thiS approach, the estimated
mefficlencles are averaged across the sample penod for each firm so that any errors resultmg from the misassignment of output wlthm the sample pen ad tend to average out
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earn higher risk-adjusted average profits for it owners. Fortunately, our
use of the profit function at least partially ameliorates these measurement problems as well-insurers that have higher-quality underwriting
and loss prevention or superior risk management will have higher average profits and higher measured profit efficiency, all else equal. Such
differences are not generally reflected in cost efficiency.
Because risks, payout patterns, and service intensity vary by line
of business, we disaggregate losses into four subcategories: short-tail
personal lines, short-tail commercial lines, long-tail personal lines, and
long-tail commercial lines.1O Because insurers report their losses incurred at undiscounted values, we discount the losses to present value
using estimated industry-wide payout patterns. ll The discounted losses
are then expressed in real 1982 dollars by deflating by the consumer
price index (CPI).12
In addition to our four insurance outputs (long- and short-tail personal and commercial lines), we also account for the intermediation
function of borrowing from policyholders and investing the funds in
marketable securities. The intermediation output is measured by the
mean of total real invested assets for the year, with the CPI (base year
is 1982) used as the deflator.

Measurement of Output Prices
The conventional measure of the price of insurance 10 prior research
is the markup of premiums over losses; that is, the ratio of premiums
to losses minus one (e.g., Pauly et al. 1986). However, the premium
represents the present value of expected losses, expenses, and profits,
whereas losses are reported as undiscounted values. To measure insurance output prices accurately, it is necessary to separate the price of
insurance from the cost of funds borrowed from policyholders by comparing premiums with the present value of losses (see, e.g., Winter

10. "Short-taI\" and "long-tail" refer to the length of time between policy mceptIOn
date and when the bulk of the loss payments have been made. In short-taIl lines such as
auto collisIOn, the lag IS usually less than 2 years, while for long-taillmes such as commercial liability some losses may remam unpaId for 10 or 15 years
11 The discount rates are based on the U.S Treasury Yield curves reported by Coleman,
Fisher, and Ibbotson (1989) and updated through 1900 using data from other sources
Payout patterns are estimated from data reported m Best's Aggregates and Averages
(A M Best Co , vanous years) We estimate the payout proportIOns usmg the method
prescnbed by the Internal Revenue Service for obtaming the present value of losses for
tax purposes
12 Losses mcurred mclude an estimate of expected mflatlOn between the reporting date
(year t) and the prOjected claIm settlement dates Thus, dlscountmg at Treasury Yields
ImpliCitly expresses losses for year t at the pnce level applicable to that year, assummg
that Treasury Yields mclude a component for expected mflatIOn. Deflatmg by the CPI then
expresses the discounted losses for the vanous years of the sample penod In real tenns
For a diSCUSSIOn of the ratIOnale for thiS procedure, see Kraus and Ross (1982)
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1994). Thus, we measure the prices of the four insurance outputs as
p, =

PREM, - PV(L,)
PV(L,)

(5)

where PREM, is the real premium for output category i, L, measures
the real losses for output category i, and PV is the present value operator. Thus, the price is the net real cost to the policyholders of having
the present value of a dollar of real losses redistributed through the
insurance company.
The price of the intermediation output is the expected rate of return
on assets, defined as the weighted average of our estimates of the expected returns on stocks and bonds. The weights are the proportions
of each insurer's Investment portfolio held in stocks and bondsY Expected investment Income is the sum of the expected income on stocks
and debt instruments. The expected rate of return on stocks for any
given year is estimated as the average 90-day Treasury-bill yield for
the year plus the expected equity risk premium for common stock with
a beta coefficient of 1.0, assuming that insurers hold stock portfolios
of average risk. 14 Using this approach smooths out fluctuations due to
capItal gains and reflects the fact that investment decisions are based
on ex ante rather than ex post returns. 15 For debt instruments, actual
income was used as a proxy for expected income because variability

13 Stocks. bonds, and short-term debt mstruments such as Treasury bills constitute
about 96% of msurer mvestment portfohos In computmg the weights, other mvestments
were assigned to the most appropnate category, e g , mortgages were assigned to the bond
category, real estate to the stock category, etc
14. The assumptIOn that msurer stock portfohos have average systemallc nsk IS reasonable because msurers tend to hold broadly diverSified portfohos (Badnnath, Kale, and Ryan
1996), so actual betas are not hkely to be far from our assumed value of 1 0 ThiS IS partly
due to the generally conservallve mvestment approach taken by most msurers and partly
due to regulallon Many states reslnct msurers from mvestmg more than a specified percentage of their assets m anyone stock and additionally restnct msurers from holdmg more
than a specified fractIOn of any finn's stock Some states also hmlt the percentage of an
msurer's total assets that can be mvested m stocks Dunng our sample penod, propertyhablhty msurers mvested between 13% and 19% of their assets m stocks so that our assumptIOn that beta = 1 has only a small effect on the total measured pnce of the mtennedtatlon output. The maJonty of their portfolios m all years was mvested m mvestment-grade
bonds. The highly pubhClzed msurance msolvenctes related to Junk bonds and real estate
mvolved hfe msurers, rather than property-hablhty msurers
15 By usmg market-based returns rather than actual returns m constructmg the pnce,
we allow for the posslblhty of some finns bemg more effiCient m mvestmg. Insurers With
consistently supenor mvestment perfonnance relallve to other msurers Will be appropnately measured as more profit effiCient, all else equal. Insurers that take more nsk also are
expected to have higher mvestment returns than msurers With more conservative portfohos
However, m a competitive market, flskler msurers command lower pnces m msurance
markets so that lower premIUm revenues would at least partly offset the higher Investment
returns.
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in debt returns across compames primarily reflects differences in the
maturity structure of bond portfolios, not inefficiency.16

Defining and Measuring Input Quantities and Prices
Insurance inputs can be classified into four groups: labor, business services, debt capital (including policyholder funds), and equity capital.
We treat labor as a variable input and measure its price by a weighted
average wage index derived from U.S. Department of Labor data on
average weekly employee wages by state for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Class 6331: Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurers. It is
important to consider interstate differences in wages because the insurers in our sample differ significantly in the geographic distribution of
their business. We take a weighted average of weekly wages by state,
using the proportions of an insurer's total premiums written III each
state as weights (insurance employment by state is not available). The
resulting series is indexed in real terms to 1982 using the CPI. The
business services input category is dominated by outside business services, such as loss-settlement services from lawyers and loss-settlement
firms.17 The input price index for business services is calculated similarly to the labor price index using SIC 7399, business services, by
state.
The final two inputs, which reflect the funding sources of the property-lIability insurance industry, are treated as fixed netputs in our analysis. The debt capital of insurers consists primarily of funds borrowed
from policyholders and is measured as the sum of loss reserves and
unearned premium reserves. Loss reserves represent the company's obligations for unpaid losses, and unearned premium reserves represent
premiums held for coverage not yet proVIded. Equity capital is an input
for the risk pooling/bearing function because it provides assurance that
the company will pay claims if they are larger than expected. Debt

16. We also conducted tests usmg an alternative measure of the intermediation output
pnce that reflects an ex ante bond return concept SpeCifically. we computed the portfolio
weights for the insurers m the sample for three categories of mvestments: (a) Bonds With
matunty greater than 1 year, (b) debt mstruments With maturity less than 1 year, and
(c) stocks. Assets not fallmg mto one of the three categones were assigned to the most
appropnate of the three categones For the ex ante return on bonds in category a, we used
the Yield on 5-year Treasury bonds, for category b, we used the Yield on 6-month Treasury
bills; and for category c, we used the 90-day Treasury-bill rate plus the beta = 1 CAPM
nsk premIUm, as explained above. The Yields were weighted by the proportIOns of the
three categones of assets m the portfolios of each msurer, and the weighted average Yield
was used as the alternative measure of the pnce of the intermediatIOn output The results
usmg this alternative mtermedlatIon output pnce measure were qualitatively the same as
those reported m the article
17 The costs of phYSical capital (mamly rental expenses and computers) are small relative to the other mputs, so we do not mclude a separate pnce for thiS type of mput.
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and equity capital are expressed in 1982 dollars by deflating by the
CPr.
It might be argued that our two fixed netputs, debt capital and equity
capital, are fixed only in the short run and may vary somewhat over
our lO-year sample period in reaction to relative price changes. However, we prefer to hold these measures statistically fixed because the
current distribution of insurer size evolved over a period of many decades. That is, the smallest firms or even the average firms could not
accumulate nearly as much policyholder debt capital or equity capital
as the largest firms in a single decade. When we tried treating the capital
variables instead as variable inputs, the profit-efficiency rankings were
completely dominated by the largest firms, which had the hIghest
profits for a given set of prices by virtue of their cumulative size.
Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, we treat the capital inputs as
fixed.
To summarize, we specify five variable outputs-real discounted
losses incurred on four types of insurance output (short- and long-tailed
for both commercial and personal lines) and real invested assets. We
also specify two variable inputs, labor and business services, and two
fixed inputs, policyholder-supplied debt capital and financial equity
capItal. These nine netputs-which are included in either quantity or
price form in the cost- and profit-efficiency equations-should reasonably represent the conditions facing insurers as they attempt to minimize costs and maximize profits.
V.

The Data

The primary source of data for this study is the A. M. Best Company
tapes, which are based on annual regulatory statements filed with state
insurance commissioners. The distribution-free approach requires a
panel of firms with data continuously available over a sufficiently long
sample period to average out most of the random error. We chose the
lO-year period 1981-90, the longest period for which all of the data
were available to us. The decision-making units in the insurance industry consist of groups of affiliated insurers under common ownership
as well as individual, unaffiliated insurers. Our sample consists of all
groups and unaffiliated insurers for which meaningful data were available over the sample period, a total of 472 insurers. These firms
accounted for 88.9% of industry assets in 1985, the midpoint of the
sample period, so that our results may be considered reasonably representative of the entire industry.
A few of the firms had incomplete information or mixed information
on their distribution systems. Of the 472 insurers used in the efficiency
estimations, 393 have clear distribution-system affiliations-l 14 direct
writers and 279 independent-agency firms. Thus, while we include the
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entire 472 firms in the efficiency estimation, we compare the average
efficiencies of only 393 of them in order to make the clearest distinction
for answering the question of why both distribution techniques persist
in the market. Summary statistics on the variables used in estimating
the models are presented in table 1.
VI.

Simple Hypothesis Tests Based on Average Inefficiencies

We estimated the cost and profit models using ordinary least squares
over the fulllO-year period 1981-90. 18 The resulting inefficiency estimates are summarized in table 2. The inefficiency ratios are categorized
by distribution system and by insurer size quartile (smallest quartile =
SIZE 1), with insurers ranked by total insurance output, which is the
sum of the four insurance outputs (the total present value of real
losses).
The "Cost Inefficiency/Actual Costs" panel of the table provides
estimates of cost inefficiency divided by actual predicted costs. These
are estimates of the proportion of actual costs that are lost due to inefficiency. The results presented in table 2 are weighted averages, with
weights proportional to predicted costs. The weighting allows us to
view the averages as estimates of the proportions of total sample costs
that are 10st. 19 We report these estimates of cost inefficiency in part to
determine whether the results of prior studies of insurance distribution
systems, which focused exclusively on costs rather than profits, are
robust to the choice of functional form and estimation methodology.
The cost-inefficiency estimates are also important for evaluating our
hypotheses to see what proportion of cost inefficiency remains as
profit inefficiency. If the prior results were due to methodological
flaws and, in fact, direct writers and independent-agency insurers were
equally cost efficient on average, then there would be no economic
puzzle of the long-term coexistence of two systems with different

18 There are 4,720 total observatIOns used In the efficiency estimatIOns (472 firms X
10 years) The recommended number of parameters to Include In Founer-flexlble specificatIOns IS 4,720 2/ 1, about 281 The full model In eq. (3) with a translog plus all first-, second-,
and third-order Founer terms had 492 parameters. To reduce thiS number while maintaining
symmetric treatment of all the outputs, we dropped all the third-order tngonometnc terms
In which the same z terms appeared more than once (I e , the terms In the sum In which
I = j, I = k, or j = k). For reasons of collineanty, we also dropped the second-order
Founer terms In which both terms represented the vanable Input pnces. The remaining
speCificatIOns had 324 parameters, reasonably close to the recommended number We note
that F-tests of the null hypotheSIS that all the Founer coeffiCients were zero always rejected
the null, confirming that the Founer-flexlble functIOnal form fits the data better than the
more commonly speCified translog form The cost- and profit-function estimates are available from the authors
19 We also conducted tests based on unwelghted averages, which give similar results
and are available from the authors
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Variables Used in the Cost and Profit Functions
Sample Means In 1990 by Insurer Type
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.104**
1522*
2215
4039*
49.91
41518
36242
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314
(43)
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costs. Presenting cost-inefficiency estimates also enables us to compare our results with those of prior frontier cost-efficiency studies in
Insurance.
Table 2 shows that independent-agency insurers are substantially
less cost efficient than insurers using the direct-writing distribution system. The average inefficiency for independent-agency firms is 43.3%,
while the average inefficiency for direct writers is only 34.1 %, a statistically significant difference of 9.2% of predicted costS.20 This result
is consIstent with the prior literature on insurance distribution systems
(Joskow 1973; Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Kim et al. 1996). Thus,
the finding that independent-agency firms have higher costs is robust to the choice of methodology and functional form. The marked
difference in measured cost efficiency between direct writers and
independent-agency insurers does not appear to be the result of differences in firm size. Direct wnters dominate Independent-agency firms
in every size class except the smallest (SIZE 1), where there is a limited
sample size of only 17 direct writers.21
The cost inefficiencies In table 2 are high relative to the costinefficiency estImates presented in prior studies of property-liability
insurers (Weiss 1990; Cummins and Weiss 1993) and most prior studies of noninsurance financial institutions (see Berger and Humphrey
1997) but lower than prior cost-inefficiency estimates for life insurers
(Gardner and Grace 1993; Yuengert 1993; Cummins and Zi 1996). As
demonstrated below, much of this measured cost inefficiency likely
reflects variation in product quality even within a group of firms with
the same distribution system.
The profit inefficiency estimates are presented in the "Standard
Profit Function" and "Alternative Profit Function" panels of table 2.
As explained above, the standard profit function takes as exogenous
the output prices, whereas the alternative profit function takes output
quantities as given. The profit-inefficiency ratio is an estimate of the
proportion of potential profits that is lost due to inefficiency.
The profit function controls for differences in expenditures on service quality for which the firm is compensated on the revenue side.
Using the cost function alone would tend to measure differences among
firms in service quality as inefficiency. That is, costs incurred by in sur-

20. Student's t-tests for differences between the dlrect-wnter and mdependent-agency
means by size quartile and overall are provided m table 2
21 The findmg that direct wnters do not appear to be more effiCient than mdependentagency msurers m the smallest size quartile IS consistent With Sass and Glsser (1989)
They hypothesize that the dlrect-wntmg dlstnbutlOn system IS more hkely to be successful
for larger finns because of the need to generate a suffiCient volume of busmess to support
exclUSive agents
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ers to provide higher-quality services would be measured as inefficiencies in the cost-function analysis. However, if the product market values these services and compensates insurers with higher revenues, then
the higher costs will be offset by the added revenues, allowing the profit
function to correct for the mismeasurement of cost inefficiency. Profit
inefficiency should include only the "true" inefficiency component of
the cost-inefficiency estimates plus any revenue inefficiencies and thus
should net out any mismeasured cost inefficiencIes that arise from extra
expenditures on product quality that are recompensed on the revenue
side.
The standard profit function results reveal that independent-agency
firms also appear to be less profit efficient on average than direct writers. The average profit inefficiency for independent-agency insurers is
48.6% and the average inefficiency for direct writers is 37.4%, a difference of 11.2% of predicted potential profits. Although this overall average difference is statistically significant, its level of significance is considerably lower than that of the overall cost-inefficiency difference in
the "Cost Inefficiency/Actual Costs" panel of the table; and none of
the measured profit-inefficiency differences by size quartile are statistically significant, in contrast to the significant cost-inefficiency differences in size classes 2, 3, and 4. We WIll directly compare profit inefficiency with cost inefficiency below.
The data in table 2 suggest that smaller firms are much less profit
efficient than larger firms, with weighted average inefficiencies declining from more than 90% for size classes I and 2 to only about 19%
for class size 4. There are three likely reasons for these measured profit
scale economies. First, there may simply be strong scale economies in
terms of insurer revenues. Since there appear to be no substantial cost
scale economies or diseconomies within the range of observed insurer
sizes, it may simply be the case that selling more insurance at a given
set of input and output prices raises revenues more than costS.22 Second,
there may be a measurement problem in companng the outputs of large
and small firms because larger firms may engage in product sublines
that are more service intensive and generate greater revenues. Third,
there may be a scale economy bias in the measured profit efficienCIes
because of the treatment of outputs as completely variable. As we argued above for treating debt and equity capital as fixed netputs, it may
take many decades for firms to build up to the size of the largest insurers
in terms of insurance output. For this reason, smaller firms may be

22 As discussed by Berger, Hancock, et al (1993), profit effiCiency could be overstated
thiS circumstance If the firm could not sell ItS full-efficiency level of output Without
lowenng pnces

III
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compared to a frontier that is effectively unattainable. This problem
does not occur for cost inefficiency because the cost equation treats all
of the output quantities as exogenous.
To determine whether the differing treatment of output between the
cost and profit functions is responsible for the profit-efficiency scale
effect, we also estimated an alternative profit function that specifies all
outputs as fixed. That is, we replace the output prices in the standard
profit function with output quantities, yielding an identical specification
to the cost function except for the dependent variable. This alternative
form also removes the one difference in specification between the cost
equation and the profit equation, to be sure that our results are not
related to specification.
The alternative profit-inefficiency estimates shown in table 2 are generally comparable although somewhat smaller than the inefficiencies
based on the standard profit function. Thus, the finding of very strong
profit scale economies is robust and does not appear to be related to
the profit-function specification.
A comparison of the profit efficiencies with some commonly used
indicators of profitability also suggest that our profit-efficiency measures are reasonably well behaved. The Spearman (rank-order) correlation of profit efficiency with return on equity (ROE) is .22 and with
return on assets (ROA) is .08, and both are statistically significant at
the 1% level. Finally, the average profit inefficiencies in table 2 suggest
that insurers tend to lose about 30% to 50% of their potential profits
to inefficiency. While these inefficiencies may seem high, they are
comparable to the profit mefficiencies found for other financial instItutions (Berger, Hancock, et al. 1993).
To conduct the simple version of our test of the market-imperfections
versus product-quality hypotheses, we compare the magnitudes of the
average cost and profit inefficiencies. If most of the measured costinefficiency difference between direct writers and independent-agency
insurers remains as a profit-inefficiency difference, then the marketimperfections hypothesis would be supported. In contrast, if most of
the measured cost-inefficiency dIfference is eliminated when profit inefficiency is measured, then the product-quality hypothesis would be
supported.
The profit-inefficiency results shown in table 2 are not directly comparable to the cost-inefficiency results shown in the' 'Cost Inefficiency /
Actual Costs" panel column of table 2 because cost inefficiency is
measured in terms of the proportion of actual predicted costs that are
wasted due to mefficiency, whereas profit inefficiency IS measured in
terms of the proportion of potentIal profits that are lost. To put the cost
and profit results in comparable terms, we restate cost inefficiency in
terms of potential profits. The restated cost-inefficiency estimates,
shown in the "Cost Inefficiency/Potential Profits" panel of table 2,
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represent the proportion of potential profits that are lost due to cost
inefficiency.23 Thus, for both costs and profits, we compute the ratio
of the dollar value of inefficiency (actual costs minus minimum costs,
potential profits minus actual profits) to potential profits. The profitinefficiency ratios should include all of the "true" inefficiency included in the cost-inefficiency ratios plus any revenue inefficiencies
and should net out any mismeasured cost inefficiencies that arise from
extra expenditures on product quality that are recompensed on the revenue side.
The weighted average cost inefficiency for independent-agency insurers is an astounding 139.3% of potential profits.24 Thus, if the cost
inefficiencies are to be believed, these firms are losing money on average. The profit inefficiencies, in contrast, are a weighted average of
only 48.6% of potential profits. Simtlarly, measured cost inefficiencies
exceed potential profits and far outstrip profit inefficiency for insurers
using the direct-writing distribution system-measured cost inefficiencies consume 118.4% of potential profits, whereas profit inefficiencies consume only 37.4%. By definition, "true" cost inefficiencies
can be no greater than profit inefficiencies since profit inefficiencies
include both cost and revenue inefficIencies. Thus, these findings are
consistent with the product-quality hypothesis, that is, the notion that
measured cost inefficiencies primarily reflect unobserved differences
in product quality that are recompensed on the revenue side, rather than
true inefficiency, even among firms using the same insurance distnbution system.
In our simple tests of the hypotheses, we compare the difference
in measured cost inefficiency between direct wnters and independentagency insurers with the profit-inefficiency difference between the two
groups. Independent-agency firms appear both more cost inefficIent and
more profit inefficient than direct-writing msurers, but the measured
cost-inefficiency difference IS much larger. The cost-mefficiency difference is 20.9% of potential profits (139.3% - 118.4%), whereas the
profit-inefficiency difference between the groups based on the standard
profit function is only 1l.2% of potential profits (48.6% - 37.4%),
about one-half as large. The discrepancy is even larger when the comparison is based on the alternative profit function. The dIfference between the ratios of cost inefficiency to alternative potential profits (not
shown in the table) for independent-agency and direct-writing insurers
23. Potential profits from the standard profit functIon were used as weights for the restated cost-mefficlency ratIOs shown m table 2 The results were similar when potential
profits from the alternative profit function were used as weights
24. The differences between the ratIOs of cost meffiCienCIeS to potential profits and both
the standard and alternative profit-mefficlency ratios are statistIcally slgmficant at the 5%
level or better for the entire sample and for each size quartile except quartile 3 Test results
are available from the authors
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is 28.8%, whereas the difference in alternative profit inefficiency IS
only 10.2%. Thus, on the basis of both profit-function specifications,
about half or more of the cost-mefficiency difference between the
groups does not carry through as profit inefficiency. These results are
consistent with the product-quality hypothesis: much of the measured
cost inefficiency is not true inefficiency but rather the costs of providing
better service.
The difference between the cost-inefficiency-to-potential-profits ratios for direct writers and independent-agency insurers is not statistically significant for the overall sample (it is significant for size classes
2 and 4), although it is much larger than the profit-inefficiency-ratio
difference and is statistically significant when predicted costs are used
as the denominator. As shown next, however, the cost-inefficiency-topotential-profits difference is statistically significant in the sophisticated-hypothesis tests, which use regression analysis to control for
other firm characteristics affecting inefficiency.
VII.

Sophisticated Hypothesis Tests Conditioning
on Firm Characteristics

The sophisticated tests of the market-imperfections and product-quality
hypotheses control for firm characteristics besides distribution systems
that may be affecting the measured inefficiencies of direct-writing and
independent-agency insurers. For example, if organizational form
(stock versus mutual ownership structure) affects the efficiency of insurers and if the distribution system is statistically related to organizational form, then the average differences in measured inefficiency between direct-writing and independent-agency insurers could be the
result of organizational form rather than distribution system. Table I
shows that independent-agency firms are much more often organized
as stock companies than are direct writers, so part of the measured
difference in efficiency between the two groups could reflect an underlying difference in efficiency between stock and mutual forms of organizatIOn. 25 Differences in business mix and scale could have similarly
confounding effects. As discussed above, it is difficult to change outputs by substantial amounts except over a period of decades.
Accordingly, we regress the cost- and profit-inefficiency ratios from
table 2 on a dummy variable for whether the firm is a direct writer
(independent agency is the omItted category) and also include controls
for organizational form, product mix, and scale to see if the effect of
25. It would not be appropnate to control for such charactenstIcs directly III the cost
or profit functIOns because there may be real effiCiency differences between finns With
different orgamzatIonal forms that would be Illcorrectly removed If orgamzatlOnal fonn
vanables were Illcluded III the cost or profit functIons
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being a direct writer on efficiency is altered by these other variables.
The sophisticated tests provide our best evidence on the product-quality
and market-imperfections hypotheses because they control for important factors besides distribution systems that may affect efficiency.
The cost-inefficiency regressions are presented in table 3. 26 The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of the measured cost
inefficiency to potential profits. Five versions of the regression model
are presented, with different combinations of the control variables.
Model 1 includes dummy variables for distribution system, organizational form, and size class. The variable DIRECT gives the effect of
being a direct writer as opposed to the base case of being an independent-agency firm, STOCK gives the effect of being a stock firm as
opposed to the base case of being a mutual organization, and SIZE 2,
SIZE 3, and SIZE 4 give the effects of being in the largest three size
classes as opposed to the base case of being In the smallest size class.
As shown, the coefficient of DIRECT is -0.367, implying that direct
writers are a predicted 36.7% more cost efficient than independentagency firms of the same organizational form and size class. This finding reinforces the results presented in table 2 and suggests an even
larger cost-inefficiency difference between insurers using the two types
of distribution systems after controlling for other factors. The other
coefficients in model 1 suggest that organizational form is not important for determining the proportlOn of potential profits lost to cost inefficiency and that larger firms are less cost efficient.
Model 2 adds control variables for product mix, defined as the ratios
of insurance output by category to total insurance output. Three output
proportions are included: long-tail personal lines and long- and shorttail commercial lines. The long-tail commercial lines proportion is the
omitted category. Inclusion of these variables (along with all the controls for organizational form and scale variables) accounts for the possibility that some firms may be stuck with SUboptimal product mix for
historical or regulatory reasons, at least over the sample period. The
regression results show that the coefficient of DIRECT becomes
slightly larger in absolute value, -0.457, and is again statistically significant, further supporting the robustness of our result that direct writers maintain a measured cost advantage over Independent-agency insurers.
Models 3, 4, and 5 test the cost-efficiency effect of distribution systems using interaction termsY We Interact DIRECT and STOCK with

26. FIfteen of the firms analyzed m table 2 were omitted from the regressIOns because
of mlssmg mformatlOn on organIzatIOnal form Omlttmg these firms m calculatmg the
averages m table 2 had no matenal effect on the results
27 We deliberately did not mclude mteractIon terms m models 1 and 2 to test whether
the results are robust to the mciuslOn or exclUSIOn of mteractlons Models 1 and 2 thus
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a measure of insurer size, LN (INS OUT), the natural log of total insurance output (discounted real losses for the four lines of insurance). The
purpose of switching to the continuous measure of scale instead of the
three dummies used in models 1 and 2 is to conserve on the number
of interaction terms. These interaction terms allow the effects of distribution system and organizational form to differ by insurer size. In order
to determine the effect of distribution system from these equations, that
is, the effect on the dependent variable of DIRECT, we take the derivative with respect to DIRECT at the mean value ofLN(lNS OUT). That
is, we evaluate aCIIaDIRECT = ~ + y LN(lNS OUT) at the mean
of the data, where CI is the cost inefficiency ratio and ~ and yare the
coefficients of DIRECT and LN(INS OUT)· DIRECT, respectively.
We similarly compute derivatives with respect to the STOCK form of
ownership. The values of these derivatives are shown in the bottom
rows of the table. 28
In model 3, we include DIRECT, STOCK, the scale variable LN (INS
OUT), and the interactions of the scale variable with the other two
variables. In model 4, we add the controls for product mix. In model
5, we also add back in the dummy variables for size class to allow for
an extra noncontmuous effect of size. The derivatives with respect to
DIRECT shown in the bottom row of the table continue to confirm the
results of the first two models, indicating that direct writers have a
statistically significant measured cost advantage of 34% or more over
independent-agency insurers in terms of potentIal profits. 29
Table 4 shows the same five regression equations as table 3, the
only difference being that the dependent variable is the ratio of profit
inefficiency to potential profits. 30 The derivatives WIth respect to

provIde a bndge between the SImple means tests presented In table 2 and the more complIcated regressIOn specIficatIOns, models 3, 4, and 5.
28 Note that whenever we Include LN(INS OUT) In the InteractIOn tenns, we also
Include Its level to be an extra control van able and also to be sure that the InteractIOns
are not plckmg up the Independent effect of sIze
29 We also conducted regreSSIOns that Included InteractIOn tenns between the organIzatIOnal fonn and dlstnbutlOn-system dummy vanables (e g , DIRECT STOCK) and InteractIons between these categOrIcal InteractIon vanables and other varIables such as finn sIZe
(e g, DIRECT STOCK LN[INS OUT]) The results, avaIlable from the authors, are
qualItatIvely SImIlar to those presented In tables 3 and 4 The only noteworthy dIfference
occurred In the most fully specIfied cost-IneffiCIency models (analogous to models 3-5 In
table 3), where there IS no SignIficant dIfference In ineffiCiency between duect-wntIng
and Independent-agency stock Insurers, whereas the effiCIency advantage of dIrect-wrIter
mutuals over Independent-agency mutuals IS statIstIcally SignIficant and ranges from 32.8%
to 46 9% A possIble explanatIon for thIS findIng IS the KIm et al (1996) hypothesIs that
the Independent-agency system helps to control owner-polIcyholder conflicts III the stock
fonn of ownershIp, leadIng to lower agency costs that may offset the cost-efficIency advantage of the dlrect-wntIng dlstnbutlOn system.
30 AgaIn, potentIal profits are based on the standard profit functIOn so that the denominator of the dependent varIable IS the same as In table 3. RegreSSIOns based on potentIal
profits from the alternatIve profit functIon yIelded SimIlar results
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Regressions of Cost Inefficiency on Firm Characteristics

INTERCEPT
DIRECT
STOCK
LONG-TAIL PERSONAL
SHORT-TAlL COMMERCIAL
SHORT-TAIL PERSONAL
SIZE 2
SIZE 3
SIZE 4
LN(lNS OUT)
LN(lNS OUT) DIRECT
LN(INS OUT) STOCK
Adj. R2
Number of ObservatIOns
aCIIaDIRECT
aCIIaSTOCK

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Coefficient

t-Ratlo

Coefficient

t-Ratlo

Coefficient

t-RatlO

Coefficient

(-RatIO

CoeffiCient

(-Ratio

145
-.367
.050

1451
-3459
526

-9461
2544
782

-6200
1830
727
-.229
- 166
- 368

-8600
1.961
890
- 998
- 805
-1320

1083
4.330
15 155

3540
-4053
103
-2430
-2788
-1844
939
3982
14731
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2.228
.611
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1.998
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-.457
011
- 529
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- 047

10215
-2457
- 961
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-.500
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-3614
-.448

NOTE -Dependent vanable = CI = dollar value of cost mefficlency/potentml profits The mean of LN(INS OUT) = the mean of the natural log of msurance output =
16503 (to calculate the denvatlve of the meffiCiency ratio With respect to the drrect-wnter dummy vanable 10 models 3, 4, and 5) The denvatlve With respect to DIRECT IS
(the coeffiCient of DIRECT) + (for models 3, 4, and 5) [the coefficient of LN(INS OUT) DIRECT] [the mean of LN(INS OUT)]
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Regressions of Profit Inefficiency on Firm Characteristics
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INTERCEPT
DIRECT
STOCK
LONG-TAIL PERSONAL
SHORT-TAIL COMMERCIAL
SHORT-TAIL PERSONAL
SIZE 2
SIZE 3
SIZE 4
LN(INS OUT)
LN(INS OUT) DIRECT
LN(INS OUT) STOCK
AdJ R2
Number of ObservatIOns
aPIIaDIRECT
aPIIaSTOCK

1961
923
1 142

2787
258
239
.072
- 069
016

-1371
-1117
-1.348
700
378
- 033
-1193
- 035
-1517

- 123
-017
- 016

-.122
- 012
-.014
658
378

657
378
- 033
- 048

-1383
-2261

- 020
- 039

- 792
-1.664

1847
1 318
1.399
1500
-1.599
268

-13616
-1447
-1.508
705
378
-017
- 732
- 642
-017

731
378
- 015
-.022

-.581
- 923

NOTE -Dependent vanable = PI = dollar value of profit IneffiCIency/potential profits The mean of LN(INS OUT) = the mean of the natural log of Insurance output =
16503 (to calculate the denvatlve of the IneffiCiency rdno WIth respect to the dlfect-wnter dummy vanable In models 3, 4, and 5) The denvatlve With respect to DIRECT I'
(the coeffiCient of DIRECT) + (for model, 3, 4, and 5) [the coeffiCient of LN(INS OUT) DIRECT] [the mean of LN(INS OUT)] ThiS table based on profit IneffiCiency
esltmates from the ,tandard proht functIOn RegreSSIOns u"ng profit Inefficlencle, from the alternative profit functIOn Yielded 'imllar results
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DIRECT in table 4 range between -1.5 and -3.3 percentage points
of potential profits, suggesting that direct writers may be only slightly
more profit efficient than independent-agency firms, considerably
smaller than the 11.2 percentage point difference shown in table 2.
Moreover, none of the derivatives of DIRECT in table 4 is significantly
different from zero. 3l
The results provide much stronger support for the product-quality
hypothesis than for the market-imperfections hypothesis. That is, the
differences in measured cost mefficiency shown in table 3 appear to
reflect unmeasured differences in product quality (service intensity),
which are recompensed by additional revenues, so that there are no
statistically significant differences in profit inefficiency between direct
writers and independent-agency firms on the basis of table 4.
VIII.

Conclusion

This article addresses the economic puzzle of why alternative distribution systems with significantly different costs are able to coexist by
provIding frontier cost- and profit-efficIency estimates for the propertyliability insurance industry. This industry provides an ideal laboratory
for testing alternative hypotheses about the coexistence of distribution
systems with different costs because the independent-agency system
is known to have higher costs for distributing virtually the same insurance contracts as the direct-writing system. We test the marketimperfections hypothesis, under which impediments to competition
allow independent-agency insurers to be less efficient, against the product-quahty hypotheis, under which independent-agency insurers incur
higher costs providing more or better services for which they are recompensed with higher revenues.
Our methodology for resolving thIS controversy involves comparing

31. We also conducted two addJ. tlOnal robustness checks (1) To check to see If dIfferences m portfolIo composItIon across msurers mIght be affectmg the results, we modIfied
our cross-sectIOnal regressIOns by addmg three portfolIo compOSItIon vanables (the proportIons of each msurer's portfolIo mvested m stocks, bonds, and short-term debt mstruments-the three most Important mvestment categones for property-lIabIlIty msurers). The
portfolIo compOSItIon vanables were not statIstIcally slgmficant m the cost-mefficlency
regressIOns (analogous to table 3) and had no matenal effect on the cost-mefficlency dIfferences or slgmficance tests between dIrect wnters and mdependent-agency firms The portfolIo vanables were statIstIcally slgmficant III the profit-Illefficlency regressIOns (analogous
to table 4) but had no matenal effect on the dlstnbutlOn-system Illefficlency dIfferences
or sigmficance tests. Thus, we do not beheve that dIfferences III portfolIo compOSItIOn are
affectmg the conclUSIOns drawn from our analYSIS (2) We reestImated our models umlttlllg
from the sample the largest and smallest 10% of firms III terms of total msurance output
The conclUSIOns are the same there IS a statIstIcally slgmficant dIfference m cost Illefficlency but no slgmficant dIfference m profit mefficlency between dlrect-wntmg and mdependent-agency Illsurers The results based on the averages (analogous to table 2) also
support SimIlar conclUSIOns after omlttmg firms III the largest and smallest sIze declles
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the frontier cost and profit mefficiencies of insurers employing the alternative distribution systems. In our simple tests, we compare the average cost and profit inefficiencies of direct-writing and independentagency firms. Under the product-quality hypothesis, higher measured
cost inefficiencies for independent-agency firms represent higherquality serVIces that are rewarded by the market with higher revenues, so that the profit-inefficiency differences between the two distribution systems should be much smaller on average than the measured
cost-inefficiency differences. In contrast, under the market-imperfections hypothesis, most of the measured cost-inefficiency differences
reflect' 'true" differences in inefficiency between the two systems that
should also be measured as profit-inefficiency differences. In our sophisticated tests, the average inefficiency differences are measured after
conditioning on factors that may not be fully under the control of insurers in the short run. These tests are based on regressions in which organizational form, business mix, and scale are included as controls.
Our empirical results confirm that independent-agency firms are less
cost efficient on average than direct writers. The principal finding of
the study is that most of the average cost-efficiency difference between
the two groups of firms does not carry through as a profit-efficiency
difference. This is a robust result that holds both m our simple tests
of average efficiency and in our sophisticated tests using regression
analysis. On the basis of averages, the profit-inefficiency difference IS
about one-half, or less, as large as the cost-inefficiency difference. On
the basis of the regression analysis, the profit-inefficiency differences
are about one-tenth as large as the cost-inefficiency differences, and
the profit-inefficiency differences are not statistically significant. We
prefer the more sophIsticated regression analysis, which suggests that
independent-agency firms are predicted to generate almost the same
profitability for delivering the same mix and quantity of outputs under
the same organizational form. The results thus provide much stronger
support for the product-quality hypothesis than for the market-imperfections hypothesis. The hIgher costs of independent-agency firms appear to be due primanly to the provision of higher-quality services,
which are compensated for by additional revenues.
These findings have potentially Important imphcations for efficIency
studies in other industries. They suggest that relying on cost efficiency
alone may produce misleading results, unless appropriate controls are
available for product quality. Such controls often are not available, especially m the services sector where outputs are often intangible and
implicitly priced. The estImation of profit efficiency may be necessary
to mitigate this problem and YIeld more meaningful efficiency estimates.
A sigmficant public policy Implication is that regulatory decisions
perhaps should not be based on costs alone. Our findings Imply that
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cost differences among insurers are mostly attributable to service differences rather than to inefficiency and therefore do not represent social
costs. Thus, using regulatory rate suppression as a policy mechanism
to reduce marketing costs, as proposed in some states, may deprive
some market segments of desired services and adversely affect economic welfare.
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